security threats with the director of the cia william burns, fbi director christopher wray. they joined other leaders from the intelligence community to talk about the importance of continued support for ukraine, the israel-hamas war, competition with china, and efforts to combat the spread of misinformation. this is about two hours and 15 minutes.

>> good afternoon. i would like to call this hearing to order and welcome to our witnesses. director of national intelligence avril haines, cia director bill burns, fbi director christopher wray, assistant secretary for intelligence and research at the state department, brett holmgren. director of national security agency, general timothy hop. and defense intelligence agency dea director jeffrey cruz. thank you for appearing before the senate intelligence committee annual worldwide threats hearing. it is important for congress and

the american people to hear directly from the leaders of our intelligence community about the threats and challenges facing the united states. i would like to first acknowledge the women and men of the u.s. intel community. most americans will never see the work you do behind the scenes, but be assured that the members of this committee know its importance and we thank you for what you do to keep america safe. the threat environment today is one of the most challenging we have seen in recent years. we have seen nations backsliding from democratic institutions, authoritarian systems seeking to impose their will upon neighbors while looking to undermine the international system that has been guarantor of stability and

security since world war ii. and we see the rise in competition around new technologies. we must ensure that our institutions evolve to meet these new challenges, which means in my mind redefining what we think of as national security. the ic was built to collect measures of hard power, how many ships, planes, and military personnel an adversary might have. the nature of strategic competition today revolves as much around not only traditional military power, but nontraditional tools and the ability to harness emerging dual use technologies. for example, advanced communication networks can provide ubiquitous connectivity but also ubiquitous surveillance. artificial intelligence can excel or rate software development but also accelerate malicious cyber attacks or the

spread of misinformation. biotechnology advancements may lead one day to curing cancer or eliminating famine but also may create genetically engineered super soldiers. access to rare minerals may help determine who shapes the energy future for the whole world. compounding all of this, the nature of conflict increasingly allows adversaries to protect power through asymmetrical means. for example, cyber attacks can disable critical infrastructure from thousands of miles away and are increasingly available to a wide array of actors. unmanned systems, drones, can threaten multibillion-dollar ships. we are even seeing the possibility of former adversaries weaponizing space in ways that could be massively destructive, not only to national security but to tools

such as gps and satellite communications. misinformation and disinformation are increasingly deployed cheaply by an array of adversarial actors. we know that more than 60 countries, over half the world population, will vote this year, and i am deeply concerned that democracy is under greater threat than ever from these foreign adversaries. bad actors like russia are particularly incentivized to interfere, given what's at stake in ukraine. poll after poll increasingly demonstrates americans are mistrustful of traditional sources of information. while ai has the tools to spread sophisticated misinformation at an unprecedented speed and scale. our ability to respond has been

hamstrung. recent litigation pending before the supreme court has had a chilling effect on the voluntary sharing of information relating to foreign malign influence and threats between u.s. government agencies and social media companies. today i would like each witness to report on how their agencies and the isd as a whole are prepared to meet technology-based challenges, and what more needs to be done. even with this new landscape, more traditional national security challenges remain. terrorist groups still threaten our homeland. over the last couple of years, we have seen authoritarian powers challenging democratic norms, undermining the international order, and intimidating their neighbors. the people's republic of china under xi jinping has presented an unprecedented challenge, a

techno-authoritarian behemoth whose economy is intertwined with our own, challenging democratic values, u.s. leadership, and global institutions, often using enormous government subsidies. china has used substantial investment power to lead or attempt to dominate a range of key industries, whether it be to the communications and huawei, social community -- social media and tiktok. another authoritarian adversary, rusher under putin has continued its brutal invasion of ukraine, illegally using military forces to seize territory. ukrainians have bravely been fending off the russian military for over two years, supported by partners around the world. the russian military has suffered severe losses of men and equipment. close to 87% of russia's prewar ground forces have been taken

out of the conflict. now as a result of his aggression, putin faces what he has always feared, a nato more united than ever. this war is at a critical phase with a serious imbalance of equipment, and my fear is the decision thus far by the house of representatives not to take up legislation that would support ukraine has been one of the most shortsighted decisions on a national security issue that i could imagine. without this decision, ukrainian defenses will be drastically undermined, as well as global confidence in america's resolve will be undermined. that will be the case whether it comes from putin in europe or the prc in taiwan. we also face continued instability in the middle east. the horrific terrorist attacks

by hamas on october 7 have been followed by an incursion by israel that has cost an estimated 30,000 palestinians their lives. while iran and partners such as hezbollah appeared to be deterred from widening the conflict for now, other iranian proxies such as the houthis and she is have attempted to expand the conflict and drag in our country. israel's war against hamas has shown the difficulty of using military force alone to eradicate a nonstate actor embedded in a civilian population, especially one that has been adept at using underground tunnels. i worry that prime minister netanyahu's conduct in the war threatens to undermine support for israel long-term, including in the united states. this international support has been key for israel's security, and as a longtime friend of

israel, this has great concern to me. in addition, we convene this timely hearing as congress faces a pressing deadline on a key national security problem, section 70 two of the foreign intelligence surveillance act provides unique and critical intelligence necessary to protect our national security, enabling the ic to prevent terrorist attacks, trap foreign spies, uncover economic espionage, protect u.s. troops, expose human and drug trafficking, and disrupt foreign cyber attacks. allowing this program to lapse would critically damage our national security. we face an increasing array and diversity of challenges, but we also have an opportunity to reinvigorate america's democratic values in the face of

autocracies like china and russia. we cannot take for granted either democracy or the international system that has kept americans safe for decades. maintaining both requires leadership, conviction, and sacrifice. >> then you and i also extend my thanks to the men and women who do the important work of keeping our country safe. at what i think you could describe as one of those pivot moments in three what life will be like for a generation is being determined now while events are changing perhaps faster than any other time in

human history. i think we have to remind ourselves if we are going to talk about the specific threats, the bigger outline picture of why things are happening the way they are, because i think they are all interrelated. in the late 2000's, the united states was basically the only country in the world that could project power anywhere at any time and we were called upon to do many things in regards of that. other nations have progressed, and i still think america by every measure, economically, culturally, militarily, remains the strongest nation and should remain that way for the foreseeable future. that order is being challenged by nations that don't like the way the world looks now. they think it benefits america and hurts them and they want to remake or replace the world they think is beneficial to america and our democratic allies with an alternative, if not a replacement. the chinese believe we are in an inevitable decline and that their rise is inevitable as well.

they don't like the rules of the world as they believe are written by america and allies, so they are taking it on themselves to challenge. they steal our ideas and innovation so their companies can do the things we do but cheaper and flood markets with those products. i don't need to tell this panel and the general public that they are expanding military keep abilities to include not just projecting power in the indo pacific but around the world. they manipulate loopholes in our country to gain strategic advantage and undermine our industries. they are a major part of flooding this country with deadly drugs that are destroying communities and ravaging entire families. they also have gotten good at hiring lobbyists and deputizing

corporate america to lobby us for things that are beneficial to the chinese goal at the expense of this country long-term. they also have to take control. anybody who says they don't know what they are talking about, because every company is controlled by the chinese communist party, they happen to have one of the world's best artificial intelligence algorithms. it is the one used by tiktok and it uses the data of americans to read your mind and predict what videos you want to see. the reason tiktok is so successful and attractive is it knows you better than you know yourself and the more you use it, the more it learns. the problem is not tiktok, the problem is the algorithm that powers it is owned by a company

in china that does whatever the chinese communist party tells it. the only way that algorithm works is if that company in china is given access to the data that tiktok provides. tiktok does not work without that algorithm and that algorithm is controlled by a company controlled by the chinese communist party under the law of china. in the case of putting bama, he sees america as decadent and in decline. he views himself as a great power and he believes great powers have a right to control the countries around their borders. they already have that in belarus in his mind and it is one of the reasons he invades ukraine. in the case of iran, they want to export the islamic revolution to the entire middle east. there are two things in the way, israel and the united states of america. that is why they have proxies in

places like syria, iraq, lebanon , yemen, gaza, who they use for their purposes. one of their purposes is to use the groups to attack america so we say it is not worth the trouble. when they leave, they will move on jordan and bahrain and make israel old -- north korea we have not heard a lot about yet.

they have become increasingly aggressive. i would argue we are closer to armed hostilities then we have been in a decade or longer. why? they feel empowered because putin is buying things from them and helping break international isolation, and i don't know what percentage of their economy is powered by ransomware hacks, but it is substantial. add to this the fact that terror is still a threat. iran, as has been publicly reported, is still trying to kill former government officials that live in the united states of america. there are former government officials in this country who require 24 hours a day security because iran is trying to kill them inside the united states. hezbollah is also looking for ways to conduct terrorist attacks against american, israeli, and jewish interests all over the world and in the homeland. al qaeda are still involved and also want to kill americans. if they could do it in the homeland, they would love that. all happening at a time in which

the single largest eventful migration in history is operating off our border. i think it is a mistake sometimes to divide these problems geographically, because they are interrelated in keyways. these individuals have different ambitions, but they share a common goal, a world friendlier for them and a world in which america is weaker and less able to act. the chinese and russians are probably -- they do see great benefit to what is happening in the middle east because they figure every second of our attention that is paid there, we are not paying to what is happening in ukraine and the indo pacific. the chinese see great benefit to ukraine as well because the more time and money we spend there, the less we have for them. the chinese think a, we deplete

ourselves in ukraine and/or the middle east, or b, we cut and run and they can say, i told you america is weak, unreliable. they have a plan for either outcome, which makes it challenging for us as we decide what to do here. these things come together and that is the overarching threat we are facing, an understanding that none of these should be viewed in isolation. the goal that north korea has, that china has may be differing goals, but one of the real goals that threaten our country is they are increasingly partnering with one another. not a formal alliance, but they are increasingly partnering with each other on selected topics, because they all share one goal, to weaken america, weaken our alliances, our standing and

capability and will because it helps them achieve the world that they envision, the world they want that comes at our expense and at the expense of all that has been built over 20 or 30 years. i think one of the greatest dangers we face is the inability to see how these things are interconnected, and one of the greatest challenges is to deal with them as if they are interconnected. i think that's what life will be like on this planet will be determined by what we do or fail to do over the next two or three years. i look forward to hearing from all of you and i appreciate you coming. >> thank you very much. chairman warner, vice chairman rubio, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today alongside my colleagues to present dic's annual threat assessment.

i want to thank publicly the people of the intelligence community, from the collector to the analyst and everybody in between, we are presenting the result of their labor at this hearing and they work every day to make our country safe and prosperous and we are proud to represent them today. i want to thank the opportunity -- to take the opportunity to thank all of you. dic's relationship to its communities is critically important, and you work with us on a bipartisan basis, especially inspiring. we are grateful for your courage and wisdom. today the united states faces an increasingly complex and interconnected threat. an environment characterized by three categories of challenges. the first is an accelerating competition with major authoritarian powers that is

working to undermine the rules-based order and the system the united states and our partners rely on for trade, commerce, flow of information, and accountability to the truth. [yelling] sen. warner: i recognize people feel passionately, but the american people deserve to hear from the leaders of the intelligence community. dir. haines: the second category is the intense transnational challenges, such as climate change, production, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and cybercrime that often interact with traditional state-based economic and security challenges. the third category is regional and localized that have far-reaching and at times cascading implications for not only neighboring countries but also the world. all three challenges are affected by trends in new and

emerging technologies, environmental changes, and economic strain stoking instability and making it that much harder to forecast developments. these dynamics are putting unprecedented burdens on the institutions and relationships that the united states relies on to manage such challenges, and perhaps more than ever highlight the need to uphold the rules-based order. i will touch on these three categories of challenges, starting with strategic competition in china, to provide context and highlight some of the intersections. president xi continues to envision china as a leading power on the world stage and chinese leaders believe it is essential to project power locally to resist u.s. pressure. they are convinced the united states will not tolerate a powerful china. the prc seeks to ensure china

can maintain positive ties to the united states and will likely continue to do so as they ceased ability and our relationship key to the capacity to attract foreign investments. boosting the domestic economy is a priority of president xi, yet he appears to be doubling down on a long-term growth strategy that will deepen public and investor pessimism near-term permit with youth unemployment around 14 .9%, no major stimulus aimed at consumption forthcoming , massive local debt, and a property -- property market in traction, 2024 is --

-- over the last year, imposing some tangible costs on u.s. firms, even as they continue to moderate such actions to avoid domestic costs. chinese leadership is pursuing a strategy to boost chinese innovation and technological self-reliance, expand efforts to acquire, steal, or compel intellectual property from others, including the united states, and engage in coercive behavior to control critical global supply chains. in the meantime, president xi's emphasis on control and central oversight is unlikely to solve the challenges posed by china's

endemic corruption, demographic decline, and structural economic constraints. over the coming year, tension between these challenges and china's aspirations for political power will probably become more apparent. beijing will continue to use military forces to intimidate its neighbors and shaped the region's actions. we expect the pla will deploy new technologies and grow more confident in joint operations with a particular focus on taiwan and the western pacific. the role intended for china's growing nuclear forces and cyber capabilities and the intent behind unprecedented growth in these areas remain a priority for us and are not unrelated to the action of russia. president putin's war of aggression against ukraine continues. ukraine's struggle to stave off

further territorial losses the past few weeks have exposed the erosion of military capabilities with declining capability of external military aid. it is critical to ukraine's defense right now and without that assistance, it is hard to imagine how ukraine will be able to maintain the hard-fought advances it has made against the russians, especially given the sustained surge in russian ammunition production. meanwhile, president putin is increasing defense spending in russia, devoting a high percentage of gdp to the military as he looks to rebuild. in many ways, this is prompted by the fact russia has paid an enormous price for the war in ukraine. not only has russia suffered more losses than any time since world war ii, setting them back years, it has also precipitated

finland and sweden's membership in nato, which putin believes requires an expansion of russia's ground forces. putin judges time is on his side and assumes a better equipped military will serve the purpose of driving that point home to western audiences. such messaging is important because putin's strategic goals remain unchanged. he sees nato enlargement and western support to ukraine as reinforcing his beliefs that the united states and europe -- and europe seek to restrict russian power and undermine him. in the meantime, russia continues to modernize and fortify nuclear weapon keep abilities even though it maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile. we may -- we remain concerned that moscow will destabilize global norms including in in the space and cyber domain permit another critical intersection is

the relationship the vice chairman noted between the government of russia, china, north korea, and iran, which is evolving as these countries expand collaboration through a web of bilateral and in some cases trilateral arrangement. the willingness to exchange a in political and intelligence matters enhances capabilities, enables them to cooperate on competitive action, assists them to undermine rules-based order, and gives them isolation from pressure. we accept these will remain far short of alliances or multilateral access. the interest to divide -- to avoid entanglements and wariness of harm and instability of action will limit cooperation and ensure it advances

nevertheless the power dynamics are shifting, creating new challenges. in particular russia's need for support in the context of ukraine has forced its to grant concessions to china, north korea and iran. as i noted in the beginning, intensifying transnational challenges intersecting with threats, with the advent of generative ai, actors interested in conducting influence operations no longer need to master a language to create false content. the threat of maligned actors exploiting these tools to undercut u.s. interests in democracy is potent as voters go to the polls in more than 60 elections around the globe this year. we have seen a massive increase in ransomware attacks globally, which went up 74% in 2023 from what it was in 2022.

u.s. entities were the most heavily targeted, many are conducted by nonstate actors with a russia based group remaining the most popular ransomware as a service provider. they were responsible for a quarter of all claimed attacks worldwide leading to a joint effort by 11 countries to take down its online domains. transnational criminal organizations and smuggling operations exploit migrants and human trafficking. in particular the threat from illicit drugs is at historic levels with mexican organization supplying and moving large amounts of synthetic opioids into the united states. more than 100,000 americans have died from drug related overdoses the past year, and most deaths have been attributed to illicit fentanyl. the threat from synthetic drugs to the health and welfare of americans remains a top priority for the intelligence community.

in the third category we have multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications, perhaps no more obvious than the middle east. the crisis in gaza is an example of how these developments have the potential for global implications. having lasted for more than five months, the gaza conflict has new security paradigms while pulling in a range of actors. the conflict has prompted new dynamics as it has entrenched old ones. we continue to assess that hezbollah and iran do not want to escalate the conflict into a full out war but the houthis entered the war and were doing so without iran. the iranian aligned groups attacking our forces are more focused on the united states than israel, using the conflict as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda. the crisis has galvanized

violence by a range of actors around the world. it is likely the gaza conflict will have a generational impact on terrorism. al qaeda and isis have directed supporters to conduct attacks against israeli and u.s. interests. it is inspiring individuals to conduct acts of anti-semitism and islamophobic care worldwide. regional and localized contexts, haiti, sudan, the republic of congo -- the list goes on. the intelligence gathering pursuant to 702 is essential in preparing this threat assessment. it is fundamental to every aspect of our work. 702 provides unique insights to foreign intelligence targets.

weapons proliferators and cyber actors and fentanyl trackers, they do it at a speed and reliability we cannot replace with any other authority. as congress pursues reauthorization, there will be reforms, and we support those. while preserving the operational agility that is vital to keeping the nation safe. thank you for your patience. we look forward to your questions. sen. warner: thank you. i know we do not normally do these on monday. i appreciate everybody coming in. we will conduct a closed session, so members holding questions on a classified nature until after that. after that, we go through the first round of questions, we will recognize questions for five minutes based on seniority.

director haines, i want to start with where you ended up on 702. this critical part of law enforcement and the intelligence committee expires and congress needs to act. 60% of all the information that goes into the brief is derived from 702 information. one of the things the vice chairman and i are proud of, we worked hard on a reform that we introduced last year, including a great number of members of this committee are part of that reform effort. trying to make sure if there was overzealous use of the fbi in terms of how things were queried

have been dramatically constrained. director wray, some have said where we went did not go far enough, and they would propose a reform that would require agencies to seek a warrant before conducting queries. could you explain what would happen at a practical level from the ic side and law enforcement side if that requirement was put in place? director wray: thank you, mr. chairman. the short answer is a warrant requirement would be untenable and largely gut the effectiveness of the authority. it would blind us to information already lawfully in our possession to review and act on and act on in a time sensitive way to stop terrorist attacks and protect victims from cyber attacks, worn somebody who was

targeted with assassination, kidnapping. second, in many instances, at the time the query would be run, we would not have the probable cause that the query term is associated with an agent of a foreign power. that is what the query tells us. you have that problem. the third problem, a lot of places we are using 702 queries are to assist victims and prevent potential victims from further attacks, whether terrorist or cyber etc. in those instances you would never get up warrant requirement, even if there was a delay built into it. that alone for these threats, which are time sensitive, that is key. i would implore congress not to take that additional step. you mentioned compliance

failures. i have been clear those failures that occurred at the fbi are wholly unacceptable, and that is why i put in a host of reforms which are covering everything from training to assistance to oversight -- i could go on and on. those reforms are working. we found 98% compliance, and commented on the reforms working. the justice reform a report found the reforms working, 99% compliant. legislation that ensures those reforms stay in place but also preserves the agility and utility of the tools we need to protect the american people. chair warner: i appreciate that. i think our reform bill have the notion of trust but verify so that we would literally legislate the reforms that had been put in place, and a few others, some additional amicus provisions. one of the things that has been

discovered, the majority of the queries that involve americans are actually on victim notification. the very notion of having a warrant to have a victim notification is contradictory in itself. i want to raise another issue that has been appropriately raised, and this is a question around bulk purchase of personal data. i think we need to go much further on data protection. i think that has been a failure of this congress to address in its past. director haines, i know you did a study on this. my fear is some of the proposed reforms would actually not limit foreign entities from obtaining this data, but limit law enforcement. can you talk to the question of bulk data purchases, data brokers? ms. haines: absolutely. from our perspective, commercially available information, as we think about

what is out there, what has been discussed in congress, is just increasingly critical to the intelligence communities. an example of this is commercial imagery, the role that they play in the context of the invasion of ukraine. but there are a series of other areas where we are purchasing information such as commercial threat information that is related to cybersecurity. at the same time, we recognize that commercially available information raises it an important issues related to privacy and civil liberties. this is in large part true because more of our daily lives are connected digitally to the world today than ever before. an increasing amount of data about individuals and their activities often perceived as not especially sensitive on its own is actually available for sale alongside increasingly sophisticated analytic tools that essentially rely on artificial intelligence, can in aggregate, raise significant

privacy issues that are relevant, which is why we basically said, we recognize this is something that is of concern. we want to make sure that we are actually addressing this issue appropriately and responsibly within the intelligence communities. we had an external panel look at this question, and really asked them how and under what circumstances should we use commercially available information. in particular to reflect on the existing framework for privacy and civil liberties. we published that report. senator wyden asked us to. as a consequence, put that out. as an intelligence community, all the heads together, agreed that those recommendations made sense. we have issued ic guidance for cataloging commercially available information acquired by ic elements to ensure that our handling of such information is consistent with security

considerations to facilitate oversight. and we have developed a framework that augments each of ic's elements, attorney general guidelines, policies with general principles, additional guidance on how ic elements should access, collect, process commercially available information including more precise guidance for identifying and dealing with categories of information that pose a greater risk of implicating privacy and civil liberties. finally, as the panel recommended, the framework set up standards and procedures that govern and require periodic reevaluation and acquisition and use divisions. the challenge that is posed by some of the legislative proposals i have seen require, for example, again, probable cause requirement before you can obtain that information.

similarly, we are not going to have, in the scenario of getting a cyber threat information, commercially, probable cause reason for that. we are trying to understand what the vulnerabilities are. we recognize that whatever the commercial information we are obtaining, we need to treat it in a way that mitigates against the risks that have been described. chair warner: senator rubio. sen. rubio: director wray, we know over the last few years millions of people across the u.s. border illegally, many released into the country. have members or people with ties to dangerous gangs, like for example, the prison gang from venezuela, where they among the people that came into this country? mr. wray: i don't know that i can speak to the specific gang but certainly we have had dangerous individuals enter the united states through a variety of sorts. sen. rubio: are we seeing crimes from people that enter the country over the last three years, some with ties to gangs, other criminal organizations?

mr. wray: what i would say is this. from an fbi perspective, we are seeing a wide array of dangerous threats that emanate from the border. that includes everything from the drug trafficking. the fbi alone sees in the fentanyl in the last two years to kill 270 million people. that is just on the fentanyl side. an awful lot of the violent crime in the united states is at the hands of gangs who are themselves involved in the distribution of that fentanyl. sen. rubio: you are also seeing law enforcement arresting -- for example, the assault on the police officers in new york. all the reporting said they had ties to this gang in particular. there is no doubt, people who were criminals in their country of origin, have cross that border are now in the u.s. committing crimes. mr. wray: correct. sen. rubio: is there a black-market emerging to sell fake social security cards, fake green cards?

have you seen reporting on that? mr. wray: certainly on the darknet, for example, there is a significant market place for different kinds of stolen identity. sen. rubio: what about on the streets? mr. wray: as well. sen. rubio: smuggling networks all over the world that specialize in moving people from all over the world including from the middle east, central asia. are we aware of any of these smuggling organizations run by or are conducted by people that have ties for example to isis or other terrorist organizations? mr. wray: i want to be careful how far i can go in open session but there is a particular network where some of the overseas facilitators of the smuggling network have isis ties that we are very concerned about, have been spending an enormous amount of effort with our partners investigating exactly what that network is up to.

that is subject of our current investigation. sen. rubio: there is a network we are concerned about that has facilitators involved that have ties to isis? mr. wray: correct. sen. rubio: i talked about tiktok in the opening. just to lay the groundwork here. tiktok, you ask an american company, they have this platform which is fascinating. very effective, a lot of members. one of the things that powers it is an algorithm based on artificial intelligence. the more you use it, the more it learns about you. it reads your mind. it knows the kinds of videos that you like in future more of them, causing you to go back. that algorithm is not owned by tiktok but by bytedance, a chinese company. the only way that algorithm works is if that chinese company has access to the data being generated by tiktok. the owner of the algorithm, bytedance, has to have access. it doesn't matter where the data is stored, they need access to

it in order for the algorithm to work. mr. wray: what you are getting to is the key point is the parent company, is for all intents and purposes, beholding to the ccp. sen. rubio: if bytedance in china is the one that owns the driver that makes tiktok effective, isn't it true that under chinese law, the chinese comet's party says that data you are gaining access to in order to make your algorithm work, we want a copy of that data? if they said that to bytedance, they would have to give it to them. mr. wray: that's my understanding. sen. rubio: if they said we want to change the algorithm so that americans see videos that hurt or help a candidate and election, bytedance has to do that under chinese law. if they said we want to put out videos that americans fight with each other, spread conspiracy theories, bytedance cannot go to chinese court and fight the communist party. they would have to do it. mr. wray: that is my understanding.

i would add that kind of influence operation, different kinds of influence operations you are describing, are extraordinarily difficult to detect, which is part of what makes the national security concerns presented by tiktok so significant. sen. rubio: thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, all of you, the people that you work with everyday. i will start with this issue of government purchases of americans data. former acting cia director, mike morel, presents something of a different view on this. he has said the amount of information available for the government to buy would "knock your socks off. if it were collected through normal intelligence methods, it would be top-secret information kept under lock and key. i believe mr. morel is right. it is the wild west out there in

terms of sensitive information on americans, and the government can buy it up. unlike normal intelligence collection, there are apparently virtually no rules here. take one public example. i want to go to you, general cruz. not to go after you especially. you said the defense intelligence agencies acknowledge purchases of actual u.s. location data. my question for you and any other members who would like to add to it, are there any constitutional or statutory limits on your agencies purchasing of the location information of americans? constitutional or statutory limits, any? >> thank you for the question, senator wyden.

yes, there are clear guidelines for all of us. when we purchased the bulk data, the first thing we do is exclude all the data that is within u.s. territory and on u.s. citizens as the first step. our teams have been here with the congress talking through our attorney general guidelines, have been speaking with the concerns that you and others have voiced to us. i think we have built the processes around our purchasing of commercial data -- sen. wyden: respectfully, i didn't hear you mention what i asked about, either constitutional or statutory limits. why don't you just send that to us for the record. i would just say, colleagues, this is the reason congress needs to pass legislation limiting government purchases of americans information. i also believe the congress needs to pass the bill that i introduced with the vice chairman, senator rubio, making sure this information is not bought up by foreign countries either.

let's go now to section 702. obviously, the government needs to have section 702 to focus on foreign threats. it is just essential that it be done without throwing aside the privacy rights of law-abiding americans. there is a workable solution. under a bipartisan solution that i've been a part of, the government wouldn't need a warrant to run searches on americans to see who they are talking to. it is only when the government wants to read the content of those private conversations that a warrant would be required even though there are also many exceptions that we have put into the bill. exception for emergencies, consent, cyber attacks, the list goes on. now, according to fbi's data, the fbi looks at content in less than 2% of its searches on

americans. so my question would be for you, director wray. as i have described it, using your data, the data from the fbi, doesn't our warrant requirement only applied to a tiny fraction of the searches the fbi conducts when you factor in all of these exceptions? i could go through them but i think you know them and i can go through them but i think know them. if there is any imminent danger, no warrant. if there are other dangers, you have to go get the warrant later, but the exception list is very long. what we are talking about in the bipartisan bill here in the senate and in the house would apply to only a small fraction of the searches you are conducting. director wray: as a percentage, it is not a significant percentage, certainly the number is significant.

the fundamental problem is it is the content that tells us whether or not it is an agent of a foreign power involved so i think that is part of the problem. sen. warner: if the witness will pause for a moment. >> permanent cease-fire [indiscernible] sen. warner: continue. director wray: i think where i got cut off was i was just expanding that the fundamental problem is in the instances where we need to look at the content, the probable cause that is lacking at this point is what is established by seeing the content. that is what tells us more often than not that there is an agent of foreign power involved in that is what enables us to act and go forward with the appropriate investigative steps. sen. wyden: there is an exception for imminent danger. there is an exception for emergencies. there is an exception to simply

conversations with foreign threats. i would like you to send to me so we will have this for the record how having those exceptions will in some way obstruct you when you are trying to deal with a tiny number of warrants. this is all about americans believing you bet we have foreign threats. there is no question about it but we can address those foreign threats in a way that is compatible with the liberty and the values that law-abiding americans hold and i'm happy to work with you on it. thank you, mr. chairman. sen. warner: senator collins. sen. collins: director, you understandably spend a considerable time talking about the significant threats that russia, china, iran, and north korea pose to our country. since the way that our

disastrous withdraw from afghanistan unfolded, we have also seen a large increase in terrorist attacks conducted by isis. in fact, those numbered nearly 200 and have resulted in some 1300 casualties, so obviously, afghanistan has shown that once again, the taliban is either unwilling or unable to control terrorist groups. are there threats of terrorist attacks from isis toward americans? are they a problem still and how are you balancing the great power competition with the threats from isis? in addition, i would like you to comment on whether or not terrorist groups backed by iran

such as hamas and hezbollah pose a threat to our homeland? director haines: thank you, senator. in terms of the threat from isis, which you are absolutely right, remains a significant counterterrorism concern for us, most of the attacks that you are talking about globally, taken on by isis, have actually occurred by parts of isis or outside of afghanistan. in afghanistan, there still remains an isis concern. it is one where, ironically, the taliban has actually -- they are also concerned about it because the isis group that is in afghanistan is in fact going after the taliban, and so this is a place where, actually, the

taliban has taken action against that group in ways that are consistent with our concerns and interests, so that is one piece. in terms of the terrorist groups that are backed by iran, that is a major issue for us, and there are a number of them, obviously. we often talk about iranian aligned militia groups that have been attacking u.s. forces and assets in iraq and syria in particular, but also in other parts of the region, attempting to. and there have been just dozens and dozens of attacks that we have been looking to manage, and that it continues to be fueled by iran. they provide weapons. they provide training. they provide money to those groups, and we still obviously see

them as a destabilizing force in the region. we also see iran's support of hezbollah, as you noted, and of hamas over the years, and so considerably -- not to mention the houthies is another example of this. my colleagues may wish to add to this. sen. collins: director wray, we know that china is the primary provider of the predecessor chemicals in the bill presses for fentanyl and you pointed out in your testimony the extraordinary scope of the amount of fentanyl that has been produced and indeed 80% of the overdoses made last year involved fentanyl but what we are also seeing is a new phenomenon that was reported by some enterprising journalists. that is that chinese nationals are establishing illegal

marijuana growing operations all over the state. one public report estimates there are more than 200 of them primarily in rural maine. they are unregulated, they are illicit, they are destroying homes because they are growing the marijuana inside and the marijuana is very potent. what is the fbi doing to support local county and state officials and why do you think the chinese have sent their citizens to rural america to establish these illegal growing operations? director wray: certainly, we are observing the same phenomenon that you are describing. we have had a number of cases that have resulted in indictments of chinese nationals with illegal marijuana grow

operations here, and otherwise involved in different kinds of organized criminal activity. we are tackling that through working with our state and local law enforcement partners through a variety of task forces. we are trying to share intelligence with them to help get ahead of the threat. i'm not sure i can give you a reason as to why it is happening but that is something that we are very focused on and you mentioned the precursors to fentanyl, the pill presses. this issue, i would just add to that, yet another one, which is that an awful lot of the meth precursors to the labs in mexico also come from china so it is fentanyl and also meth. so there is certainly a big degree to which problems that we are experiencing here in an acute way, it sourced back to them. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. according to the annual threat

assessment, president putin probably believes "that his approach to winning the war in ukraine is paying off, and the western and u.s. support to ukraine is finite." for any of you, what lessons is putin taking from the u.s. failure to further support ukraine and its fight for national survival? and what lessons might china's xi jinping learn from this failure? >> senator, i would be glad to address your question. i just returned from my 10th visit to ukraine during the course of the war and you know, i left convinced that we are at a profoundly important crossroads for ukraine, for european security, and for long-term american interests around the world. down one road with supplemental assistance approved by the congress lies the very real possibility of cementing a strategic success for ukraine and a strategic loss for vladimir putin's russia.

it is our assessment that with supplemental assistance, ukraine can hold its own on the front lines through 2024 and into early 2025, that ukraine can continue to exact costs against russia not only with the penetration strikes in crimea but also against russia's black sea fleet which resulted in 15 russian ships sunk over the course of the last six months. with supplemental assistance, ukraine can put itself in a position by the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025 where it could regain the offensive initiative and also put itself in a position to negotiate from a position of greater strength and achieve an outcome in which putin's goal, which was to subjugate ukraine and to control its choices, would be denied, where ukraine could sustain itself as a strong, sovereign, independent country, anchor it

self in western institutions, and have the space and the security to recover from this terrible aggression and leave russia to deal with the long-term consequences of putin's brutal and foolish invasion. down another road, however, without supplemental assistance, it seems to me, lies a much grimmer future. ukraine is likely to lose ground and probably significant ground in 2024. i saw, you know, in the battle which forced a rushed withdrawal of ukrainian forces a couple of days before i was in kyiv on this last visit, the consequences of that. you know, one senior ukrainian partner describe what happened to me. he said that, you know, our men fought as long and as hard as they could, we ran out of ammunition, and the russians

just kept coming. and i think without supplemental assistance in 2024, you are going to see more of that and that, it seems to me, would be a massive and historic mistake for the united states. >> what lesson do you think the ccp will take from that? director burns: i think the consequent of that will not just be for ukraine or european security. >> -- palestinian people. children are being starved to death. don't support -- [indiscernible] stop sending arms to israel. stop supporting starvation of children. children are being starved to death! sen. warner: we shall continue. director burns: i think the consequences of that will be felt not only by ukrainians and european security but across the indo pacific where if we are seen to be walking away from support for ukraine, not only is not going to feed down's amongst our allies and partners in the indo pacific, it's going to stoke the ambitions of the chinese

leadership in contingencies ranging from taiwan to the south china sea. so that is what i saw on this last visit. that is what i think is at stake for all of us. i think the truth is that the ukrainians are not running out of courage and tenacity. they are running out of ammunition, and we are running out of time to help them. >> director, let's jump to the elephant in the room. i want to thank you for your efforts to secure hostage polices and a cease-fire in the middle east. ramadan has now begun. give us to the best of your ability a little bit on where things stand with those negotiations and what flash points you might be concerned could push us into a more regional conflict over the course of the next month. director burns: sure. since the last hostage return and cease-fire in november, the president has been working very hard to try to renew that

process. i have traveled eight times to meet with my israeli, egyptian and qatari partners, and returned most recently on saturday night from the last such trip. what is on the table right now is a potential agreement that has three main elements. the first would be the return of about 40 hostages. these are the remaining women hostages. older men, and hostages who are wounded or seriously ill. that is the first step, the first phase toward the return of all of the hostages, which another president is deeply committed. that would be in return for a defined number of palestinian prisoners held by the israelis. the second element is a cease-fire of at least six weeks. again, as the first step toward what might be more enduring arrangements over time, and then the third element would be a

major surge in humanitarian assistance which could be distributed effectively to people who so deeply need them. so we are going to continue to work hard at this. i don't think anybody can guarantee success. what i think you can guarantee is that the alternatives are worse for innocent civilians in gaza who are suffering under desperate conditions, for the hostages and their families who are suffering also under very desperate conditions, and for all of us so we are going to keep at this. >> mr. chairman, i have a number of questions, but we have a lot of ground to cover here and mine need to be in a classified setting. i'm going to wait until closed session. >> the senator was going to address the real elephant in the

room with some of our audience members accusing you of serious conduct, so i want to give you a chance to respond to what has been said. is israel exterminating the palestinian people? director burns: senator, all i can say is, you know, what i said before. i think there are a lot of innocent civilians in gaza who are in desperate conditions right now. i think there are hostages and their families who are also in desperate circumstances as well and i think i have learned a long time ago in crises like this that you have to find a practical goal and pursue it relentlessly. and the goal the president has laid out, working with our israeli, egyptian and qatari partners, i think, is the most practical one i can see right now is to produce a cease-fire of at least six weeks, produce the return of the hostages. ultimately, all of the hostages, and get desperately needed humanitarian relief to people who need it in gaza. sen. cotton: is that a no, you

do not believe israel is exterminating the palestinian people? director burns: i think israel -- i understand israel's need -- the president has emphasized this -- to respond to the brutish attack that israelis suffered on the seventh of october against hamas, against a terrorist group, but i think we all also have to be mindful of the, you know, enormous toll this has taken. as the president has said, it is important for israel to be extremely mindful of that, and avoid further loss of civilian life. sen. cotton: director, do you believe israel is exterminating the palestinian people? director haines: i really don't have anything to add to what director burns has said. i fully endorse what he is commenting on. sen. cotton: you also stand accused of starving the palestinian children. is israel starving children in palestine?

director burns: the reality is that there are children who are starving. sen. cotton: but is israel doing that? director burns: humanitarian assistance cannot get to them. it is very difficult to distribute humanitarian assistance effectively unless you have a cease-fire which is exactly why, you know, i think there is great value in what is on the table now, a return of hostages and a significant cease-fire enabling people to get that humanitarian assistance. sen. cotton: ok. for the record, i do not believe that israel nor any of you or the united states government is exterminating the palestinian people or starving palestinian children. director haines, there have been several news reports, you might say leaks, to the effect that iran does not have full control of its proxy groups. that is the headline from politico last month. the quote. while iran is supporting them financially and with military equipment, intelligence officials not believe it is commanding the attacks. this lack of control over the

houthis and the militias in iraq and syria has muddied the deliberations in washington about how to respond to repeated attacks on u.s. interests in the region including the attack in jordan on january 28 that killed three american troops. but on page 18 of the assessment, the intelligence committee writes tehran was able to flex the network military capabilities in the aftermath of of hamas' attack on october 7, orchestrating anti-israel and anti-u.s. attacks from lebanon while -- from significant consequences. -- while shielding leaders from significant consequences. orchestrating is stronger than anything i have heard. it is not providing support or training or funding. so it is your assessment that the intelligence committee assessment that tehran has orchestrated attacks on israel and against u.s. personnel in the middle east since october 7? director haines: yes.

and i don't think that means that the proxy groups or that others are always listening to everything that they have to say or under their direct control but i think orchestrating is an appropriate characterization of what they look to do. sen. cotton: so to use the dictionary definition, it has arranged or directed the elements of a situation to produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously. that is correct? ok. director burns, on page 34 of the assessment, the notes that the fbi and department of energy have concluded the most likely origins for the coronavirus pandemic was a laboratory in wuhan, but the cia cannot agree with that conclusively. why can't the cia reach the same conclusion of the fbi and the department of energy have reached? director burns: our analysts continue to look at this very carefully. they have not yet concluded that there is definitive evidence on either side of this, whether

natural transmission or lab accident. we continue to pursue, you know, more intelligence, more information that might help them to reach a definitive conclusion but right now, they have not been able to reach that. sen. cotton: director ray, -- director wray, why are your analysts so much more confident? director wray: our analysts did very rigorous work involving a whole slew of experts of different sorts. we reached the assessment with moderate confidence and we stand by that assessment. >> thank you. >> senator kaine. >> thank you, mr. chairman. as others have said, thank you to the people who operate under very difficult circumstances around the world to supply us with this important information. director burns, i want to say that your statement about the impact and long-term consequences of our abandoning ukraine is important, and i think should be required reading around here. the implications are that it is a 50 year mistake that would haunt this country both in europe but also, as you suggest,

in the indo pacific, including kim jong-un. he would assess that we did not have the staying power. he's already making noises about the peninsula. director wray, you talked with senator rubio about tiktok. just to reiterate, it is dangerous because it allows the chinese communist party to have access to an enormous trove of data about americans. that is number one. is that correct? director wray: that is one of the pieces of it. there are several. sen. king: the second piece is that the misinformation and sort of policy direction that it enables the communist party to exercise, correct? director wray: well, i think the second piece is the algorithm. in other words, the first is the data, the second is the algorithm, the third is the software. sen. king: but the problem is

not tiktok, it is the control by china. if tiktok were owned by an american company, belgian company, or british company, we would not have this level of problem, is that correct? director wray: correct. sen. king: thank you. who controls mexico? is the government of mexico in control or are the cartels in control? and how do we get at the problem of the drugs, the fentanyl? by the way, i did a little calculation a minute ago. about 15 people have died in this country of overdoses since this hearing started an hour and 20 minutes ago. that is how serious this problem -- one a day in my state of maine. how do we get control of this problem? director haines: i will start. there are a lot of us come obviously, that are working to help support those who are on the frontlines of this which include the fbi, obviously, dea, dhs, and others who are really focused on this question, but on

the first point, senator king, with respect to mexico, there is no question that it has a challenge for the government of mexico to deal with the cartels, and there are parts of the country that are effectively under the control of the cartels in certain respects. yet at the same time, would say that our cooperation with them has improved over time and i think director burns and director wray may have more to say on this, but this is an area where we have really been able to work with them and try to help them. sen. king: obviously, we have been able to work and it is improving but this is a drastic problem that should be treated as such in terms of the impact on americans. maybe this is a dhs question, but do we know how fentanyl is actually getting in? where is it coming? director wray: you mean coming

sen. king: how does it get into the director wray: it is coming at the ports of entry but there is a variety of ways he gets in. part of the challenge of fentanyl is of course how small it is and how easy it is to conceal and how easy it is to be innovative in ways to get it across the border. the vast majority of the fentanyl that is killing americans is of course coming from mexico, and the vast majority of the precursors for that fentanyl is coming from china. sen. king: i should mention that in the supplemental that is pending in the house, which we always focus on ukraine, there is also a major fentanyl blocking provision that would be very important to this country to get -- to have enacted as soon as possible. director haines, you are nodding but the record does not show nodding. can you -- director haines: absolutely. there's funding for the capacity to degraded detection and things like that that the dhs would be deploying, i believe, among

others, and absolutely agree that this is a fundamental issue and we can also talk more in closed session about some of the organizational things we are looking to do. sen. king: we have a major bill to address fentanyl in that supplemental if we can get that out of its limbo in the house. general, one question. i am concerned about a gap. nsa can talk about foreign intelligence gathering not in the u.s. here is my worry. -- here is my worry. st. petersburg, russia farm tax -- russia troll farm hacks information in the united states through a server in new jersey or pennsylvania or california. does that create a gap? talk to me about the relationship between yourself, the nsa, and the fbi. just worried that there is a place where we may lose contact. >> senator, thank you for the

question. if we think about this right now today in the context of threats to our elections, we spend an enormous amount of time collaborating across all the elements of the u.s. government to make sure that we are aligned and that we are appropriately using our authorities to be able to garner whatever information is required to be able to identify a foreign threat. first and foremost, we are going to collect that threat of a foreign intelligence target outside the united states and so one of those tools that really assists in this type of scenario is section 702 and our ability -- because by its very nature, if there is an origin of that threat, that there is a foreign entity communicating with in the united states with a communications provider, it offers us an opportunity under section 70 two to target that foreign intelligence threat outside the united states. and so with the reauthorization of section 702, that would ensure one means by which we are able to see the foreign part of that communication.

sen. king: thank you, mr. chairman. sen. warner: senator cornyn. sen. cornyn: director wray, i wanted to ask you a little bit about some of your testimony about the border. last year, 169 individuals on the terrorist watch list were detained at the southern border. so far this year, it has been 58. we know there were, since 2021, approximately 1.8 million got always, not people who turn themselves in, not people paroled in the interior, but 1.8 million migrants who were evading law enforcement at the border. can you tell us, the american people, with any certainty that there are zero people on the terrorist watchlist that were among that

1.8 million got aways? director wray: what i would say is you rightly highlighted kind of, if you remember what secretary rumsfeld used to refer to, the no nones and the unknown nones, and in many ways, the national security ramifications of the issues at the border are better reflected in some ways more by what we do not know about the people who snuck in and provided fake documents or in some other way got in when there was not sufficient information available at the time they came into connect the dots. it is almost more significant in our view than the actual number of so-called kst's because those people, for the most part, are stopped, detained, and processed appropriately. sen. cornyn: and i guess you would not answer the same way that people with criminal records, members of criminal street gangs, and others being among that 1.8 million figure for migrants who got away.

we don't know what that is composed of, do we? director wray: that is correct. sen. cornyn: what we do know is that more than 37,000 chinese nationals were detained at the u.s. southern border in 2023 and that number is up 10 times over the earlier tally. and these individuals who were of course detained, sometimes, they claim asylum, sometimes, they are paroled into the interior, but again, we don't know how many chinese nationals that may be among that 1.8 million got aways that have made their way into the interior of the united states, you would answer the same way? director wray: right. we don't know what we are dealing with in a particular context.

it is especially challenging because presumably, within that group, you have got not only people who may mean us harm but also people who are fleeing the ccp and share our concerns about there authoritarian thuggishness. sen. cornyn: this is a gaping vulnerability in our national security, that we do not have answers for. i am reminded that there were 26 co-conspirators in the 9/11 attacks against the united states, killing 3000 people. 26 people killed 3000 americans on 9/11. i worry that among the people that are coming across the border, that are evading law enforcement, that there are some people among those that mean to do us harm. do you share that concern? director wray: i do. sen. burr: -- sen. cornyn: in fact, according to public sources, cnn on august 30th, 20

23, you alluded to this earlier about dozens of migrants from uzbekistan that were being facilitated by a suspected isis agent in turkey that was assisting those migrants to make their way to the southern border and into the united states, correct? director wray: that is a threat stream we are very concerned about, actively investigating working with dhs on both people whose travel was facilitated but also members of the facilitation network in some other way overseas and there's probably more i could share on that in closed session if you would like. sen. cornyn: one of the things that i think this reveals is that our border situation, the illegal immigration has changed over the years. it seems to me, coming from a border state, years ago you would look at people coming across who wanted to work, wanted to provide for their family. now, of course, we understand people fleeing violence and poverty and things like that.

also we see the fact that if you make it to the border, you can likely stay for the rest of your natural life. it is an enormous magnet for people to come. but also, and not just people who have benign intentions towards the united states who want a better life, but also people that want to do us harm. i know sometimes, people say, well, this is just a fantastic theory. no basis in reality. do you consider that to be a frivolous consideration? director wray: i do not. i have been very vocal about this. we of course are not responsible for the physical security of the border. we work hard to be good partners with dhs on that but there are a whole host of threats that emanate from the border. and some of them are criminal threats. we talked about violence. and then of course we have concerns that it could be a vulnerability that terrorist organizations could seek to exploit.

i would add that we are not at the moment tracking any specific terrorist plot coming across the border in that regard but it was not that long ago, as you will recall, that we had indictments of an individual who was trying to smuggle foreign nationals across the border to assassinate former president bush. so it goes to your point that numbers are important but numbers do not tell the whole story. it only takes a few people who can be responsible for a whole lot of harm. sen. warner: senator bennet. sen. bennet: thank you. thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you all for being here. thank you for your service. director burns, the fbi director just mentioned president bush. i think you were his -- you had one of the longest career -- distinguished careers in american diplomacy. and now you are in the middle of a

and now, you are in the middle of a negotiation in the middle east that i think everybody up here hopes that you are going to be successful about. in that context, i want to ask you about the supplemental bill that has the ukraine funding in it. that is a bill that passed out of the senate with 70 votes. we almost don't pass anything around here with 70 votes, or broad bipartisan recognition of the importance of that bill. i agree with your assessment and the intelligence committee assessment that ukraine has the possibility to prevail in this conflict with russia. nobody two years ago would have believed that but the way they fought, the way they have been able to be supported by our intelligence, obviously, it has made a difference. they succeeded in ways nobody could have imagined. there are people here and there are people in the house that don't believe that. the assessment is different than the intelligence

communities and their judgment is different. but i would ask you since you are here a little bit about the negotiating posture that ukraine, the west, nato wants to put ourselves in with vladimir putin and considering that question, i'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about whether or not our negotiating position, if you are somebody who believes in the end that somehow ukraine cannot prevail although i believe they can, and believes only that they can be in a position to negotiate an end to this, why would it be better for us to pass the supplemental from that vantage point than to fail to pass the supplemental? >> thanks very much, senator. today, first, i will start with

vladimir putin and russia. it is our assessment that russia is not serious about negotiations today in the sense that they may be interested in the theory of negotiations but they are not interested in negotiating in the sense of compromise right now because as director hans said in her opening remarks, i think president putin believes time is on his side, that he can grind down ukrainians and wear down the rest of us so if you look at the prospect of a more serious negotiation in the future, it is essential for ukraine with our support to disabuse the russian leadership of that notion, to puncture his confidence that time is on his side, to demonstrate that for russia

also, there are long-term consequences to this war. they have already suffered anonymously in terms of their military. 215,000 plus dead and wounded. four times the casualties that the soviet union suffered in a decade of war in afghanistan. the destruction of something on the order of two thirds of their prewar tank inventory and long-term economic consequences which is fast making russia at the economic vassal of china. not to mention a much stronger and bigger nato that they had to face today. the challenge in 2024 is helping the ukrainians not just to hold their own but to continue to impose costs so that they would be in a position of greater strength, greater leverage in a negotiation and i think that would be my answer to that question. if you want to get her a serious negotiation, you have to help the ukrainians demonstrate that putin is wrong in his notion that time is on his side. >> that logic seems fairly compelling to me. let me ask you another question. since you serve republican and democratic presidents over many decades, you hear people in this building say that the united states of america has to give up on our support for ukraine in actual conflict with vladimir putin, in actual conflict with russia, because of this fear that we will not be able to afford some plausible but nevertheless theoretical conflict with china in the future.

do you believe the united states of america cannot handle our commitments with respect to ukraine and nato and be able to deter beijing as well? >> no, i don't believe that. i think we are entirely capable. senator rubio said this earlier. i think the united states, while we may not have uncontested privacy in the world today, we still have a stronger hand to play than any of our adversaries or rivals so we are entirely capable of continuing to support ukraine in a conflict that has consequences well beyond ukraine and european security and i think sustaining that support for ukraine not only doesn't come at the expense of deterring china, it actually helps to deter china, whether it is in

taiwan or the south china sea or other places. it is our assessment that xi jinping was sobered, you know, by what happened especially in the first year of the war. he did not expect that ukraine would resist with the courage and tenacity that the ukrainians demonstrated. he did not expect that the united states, who he believes is a defining power, would step up in the way the president has led with all of yours or to show solidarity with ukraine as well. that has had an impact far beyond ukraine or european security and that is what is at stake today. >> we look back at that $60 billion and say it was a bargain compared to what we would otherwise spend. mr. chairman, my colleagues i think almost all of them went over 1.5 minutes so let me say in the last 15 seconds that our threat assessment --

>> i think the record will stand corrected. you have a couple seconds. >> director hans, i will take it for the record, but there is, in the document, reference to the serious issues that we are confronting in space right now. had i more time to ask you about that, we would have a conversation. >> german warner, thank you. director burns, i was -- my request among others was that director over door intervene with china -- chinese leadership and ask for the precursors to not be imported into mexico by utilized or end up as fentanyl in the united states. he committed to doing that.

my understanding from his government as well as public sources is that he did and then there seems to be some level of interest on the part of china in negotiating with us or having conversations with the united states about that topic. i don't know that much has come from that but you may tell me i am wrong. what explains the chinese unwillingness to be more proactive in combating precursor chemicals coming to the u.s.? is this -- do they have the capability? intentionally inflicting harm on americans in america? is there some quid pro quo they are looking for? >> since the president met with president xi in november in california, they have been some signs of greater chinese seriousness about dealing with this problem, effectively enforcing the wrong law because that is all we are asking.

when i was in beijing in late may of last year, i raised this issue directly with my counterparts as well so i think there are some signs that the chinese are beginning to address the problem not just in precursor chemicals but also of pill pressing equipment and certainly, they can do more and that is why it is so important for all of us to continue to push as hard as we can and to make clear as you indicated earlier that this is a problem not only for the united states but for mexico and others around the world. >> what would be china's reluctance to crack down on those exports? >> i hope that what you are seeing now is readiness to do more i think since november but that is something that obviously from the president on down, we need to continue to reinforce as hard as we can. they do bear some responsibility for what is happening in our own society. >> how do you assess the current balance of military power in the pacific today, the united states, china, and others?

>> i would describe the balance of power today as china is on a rise and it has been planning for multiple five-year periods and it has educated that development, the exercising in a way that has put them in a position that had at some point -- they will be a world leading military power. the united states is the worlds leading military power today and so the imperative piece for us is to be on the same trajectory to match them stride for stride and ensure we stay ahead of the growth that we see in china. if there is no doubt, the growth that you see has been discussed today in military power associated with china and the rise in all domains, cyber, space, as well as conventional.

>> director haynes, has iran sought to use our borders to conduct terrorist activities in the united states? >> yes. we have a very good example of iran supporting them in effect, efforts to come across the border, to go after the former ambassador from saudi arabia, for example. there was a case in that scenario so they have historically attempted this but -- attempted this but it has been challenging for them and something that we consistently monitor on a regular basis and prefer to go through to the extent that they are able. sort of criminal entities and other groups as a way of trying to achieve their goals. >> director wray, there was reports of our military technologies being utilized in north korean military equipment

found in ukraine, coming from russia. how do we explain that? >> well, i am definitely tracking a similar instance in terms of iranian drones, for example where u.s. technology has appeared as components. part of it has to do with dual use technologies and companies here not being perhaps as vigilant as they need to be about the potential uses of their technologies and so, we are trying to be very heavily engaged with the private sector to make sure that they are more thoughtful about who they are sending to and where their pieces and components may end up. >> even though you gave senator bennet additional time, i will not ask for it. >> senator casey. >> thank you very much. i want to thank the panel for your testimony today and also for your public service. i want to follow up on the fentanyl and ask a related question about zaila zine.

i know our colleagues have mentioned and asked questions about fentanyl. i will start with director wray, to direct your attention to this question about fentanyl. the threat assessment this year on page 36 says that china remains a primary source for illicit fentanyl, precursor chemicals intel press equipment, and then it goes on to talk about what the cartels do. it is noteworthy i think that the u.s. sentencing commission told us that in fiscal year 2022, 80 8% of fentanyl trafficking vendors were u.s. citizens, 88 percent. in fiscal year 21, 80 6% of fentanyl trafficking for u.s. citizens. we know how it gets here. we have a good sense of how it gets here. we know the administration as that it made -- some may believe progress in reestablishing coordination with the chinese government in countering fentanyl.

i am increasingly concerned as well about zaila zine and other non-fentanyl synthetic opioids. zaila zine -- it is a powerful veterinary sedative that is mixed with illicit fentanyl and the city of philadelphia has become almost ground zero for the proliferation of illicit drug. according to the dea, it was detected in nearly half, half of all fentanyl related overdoses in philly. i wanted to ask you, is the chinese government holding up its end of the bargain and cracking down on illicit fentanyl traffickers? >> i would say the scale of the problem that we are continuing to see suggests to me that there is a lot of room for improvement from the chinese government. let me just put it that way. you mentioned the drug. certainly, it is of concern to us.

you are right that the philadelphia area is a place where we are seeing a certain amount of that. we got a lot of investigations in the areas. of course, one of the problems with the drug is that it is not responsive to narcan so that just as to the challenge and certainly, it has been found in drug combinations and i think maybe 48 of the 50 states or something. it's very easy to buy unfortunately online from china-based suppliers so that as to the problem.

we are trying to engage in your area and nearby areas with hospitals and state diversion groups to try and raise awareness about it. but it is not a controlled substance currently under the u.s. controlled substance act so that is just an additional kind of aggravating circumstance. >> to what extent is regulation by china of synthetic opioids part of the u.s. law enforcement's discussions with their chinese counterparts? >> certainly trying to work with the chinese on their controlled substances listings is a key part of it. part of the problem with precursors of course is that there is an almost infinite number of variations that people can come up with so even when they schedule things, you see new oneness is crop up in their stead said that as to the challenge. you asked how serious are they? i would point to the sheer volume that we are contending with and i think that tells you all you need to know about how serious the chinese are. so far -- the chinese are so far in helping us address the problem. >> i want to ask you about iranian evasion of sanctions. since the imposition of increased sanctions against

iranian oil and 2018 and 2019, iran has been increasingly successful in finding ways to evade sanctions and its oil revenues are increasingly rising. the administration is focused on blocking iran's oil exports. how is the intelligence community supporting the administration's efforts to impose further costs on iran including by focusing on identifying and sanctioning so-called ghost fleet vessels carrying iranian oil and chinese refineries -- purchasing arabian oil? >> thank you. we are very involved is the short answer but the longer answer is -- we actually do periodic reports to congress that tell you about some of the work that we do in this area where we are identifying where we see sanctions evasion, where we see opportunities for essentially additional targets

for sanctions that might be acted on third parties and others who were involved in these transactions so that the treasury department and others can in fact go after them in that respect. it is a critical issue. >> mr. chairman? >> thank you, senator. thanks to all of you. please pass on our thanks and gratitude to them. most folks will never know who they are and not get a chance to be able to say thank you so please pass that on as well. i want to continue some of the conversation at the border because while we are dealing with worldwide threats, we are seeing worldwide threats coming towards us and obvious vulnerabilities.

as has been mentioned, talked about in the past, in this fiscal year, 58 people on the terror watch list who have been identified and picked up. there is a category called special-interest aliens and you are familiar with that as well. the special-interest aliens, many people may not know this definition so i'm going to read it, what this designation is. non-us person who based on a -- analysis of travel patterns potentially poses a national security risk to the united states or its interests. many are employing travel patterns and have a nexused terrorism. do we have a list of how many people that have across our southern border that we have identified that are special-interest aliens? director wray, do you know the number? >> i don't know the number but we can follow-up with you to see if that is something we can provide. >> it has been one of our challenge is to identify that. on the terror watch list, we can get the number and know that it is 58 exactly. when we ask about special-interest aliens, we are told that it is law enforcement sensitive. we know the number is in the thousands but have not been able to get a specific number nor a specific tracking on that so that would be hopeful to know because the next question is the obvious one. those individuals that are coming in, i want to give a number of it, it is in the

thousands, at the fbi said they are coming across the border, released into the country because the vast majority, we don't have a criminal background information on them. we have a theory so they are released into the country currently. as the fbi kept in contact with dhs and others, who those individuals are and what kind of tracking and monitoring is on those individuals? >> i know we work closely with dhs, especially cbp come on the issue of special-interest aliens including a whole lot of work on the other side of the border to try and prevent them from coming in in the first place and i know there are in and says where they are contacted but i'm not sure as i sit here right now that i can tell you we are contacted in every instance. >> that is helpful. let me give you some attention here. the state department is very engaged in this and trying to figure out on the intelligence side the information sharing. this in the visuals who are crossing the border right now

from any of those countries, we don't have any criminal information on these individuals. do you know just offhand how many countries that are coming into the united states when they are crossing our southern border, we have criminal background information? venezuela, we were talking about venezuelan gangs. many of them paroled into the country. it is in venezuela freely sharing their criminal records with us and do we know if these individuals have a criminal record? >> thank you, senator. i don't know if venezuela is sharing specific information but what i can say is obviously that we have seen over 7 million venezuelans emigrate from the country since 2017. a significant portion of whom obviously have emigrated to the united states legally but when we do get relevant information from our counterparts and dhs and fbi, our analyst use that to form the judgments.

>> nicaragua is not taking people back on that and we are dependent on the state department to impose systems court of -- sort of consequences. you are not taking people back on that. do you know any of the conversation right now between nicaragua and the united states on trying to deal with that? we have attracting of some who have criminal records that are coming towards us and consider that a threat. >> i don't have any specifics on the details or engagement with nicaragua. i'm happy to follow-up with you offline. >> that would be great. then we talked a little bit about it. this is an acronym people don't know. any terrorism. we had this since 2007. it expired in july of last year and has not been reauthorized yet. one of the aspects of that is for chemical facility refiners, whatever it may be, they have the ability to check against the terror watch list using their authority on that. it is about 9000 people a month that used to be checked on that just in the hiring in the process all over the country with 63,000 people estimating

that it had not been checked. how many people show up as a hit on the terror watch list from the hiring in the past? when we do that check on it which now is not occurring, we have not reauthorized this. how many folks are on the terror watch list? >> i will tell you i share your concern about the lapse in the authorities and one of the challenges of this particular space is that it does not take many for it to be a real problem then we rely on that authority or we historically have to protect. >> can you say that number is not zero one that has been run in the past? >> correct. >> could you have given their witnesses homework?

senator. if you want to defer to senator kelly, i would be happy to but we are doing it by seniority. >> mr. chairman, in new york's capital region, and the albany complex is set to house some of our nation's most advanced electronics, research development, and manufacturing. today's annual threat assessment points out that china currently lags behind the u.s. in developing the most advanced chips, giving them motive to steal our technology which they have done over and over. i included legislation requiring dod to establish a pilot program to enable collaboration between the nsa's cybersecurity collaboration center and the u.s. semiconductor manufacturers to improve the cybersecurity and semiconductor design and manufacturing process. general, how is the nsa working

with the fbi to create safeguards against espionage and cyber attacks at leading public research facilities and its semiconductor many factors? >> thank you for the question. in terms of how we think about the china cyber threat, it is clear that they are going to be relentless to intend to steal intellectual property so from our perspective, part of what the nsa has really focused on doing is eliminating that threat. so we have done a series of unclassified as batteries with a number -- advisories with a number of partners. six other nations and multiple companies to illuminate that threat to get unity of action against that threat. unclassified reports to allow increased unity of action so from the fbi's perspective, they are a teammate in everything we do that talks about the cyber threat within the united states.

and from a specific look at semiconductors, critical technology that clearly china wants to catch up on and from our perspective, an area we will continue to identify those threats and communicate those both through the fbi and through classified advisories wherever we can. >> i would agree with everything the general just said and i would add that we have set up counterintelligence taskforces in all 56 field offices including in the albany area in the nsa is a key participant with us in our national effort in that regard. in addition to the unclassified situation that can be shared through the good work we do together, one of the advantages to the fbi engaging with private companies is because we get information from so many different sources. there are times we can share information with a private sector entity that helps protect nsa's sources and methods because it does not clearly get identified in this is something nsa told us.

>> research from the center for capturing digital hate found that the image generators create election disinformation in 41% of cases including images that could support false claims about candidates for election fraud in spite of controls we have been told have been put in place. this is for the entire panel. have any of you see in foreign adversaries with intent to use generative ai, either images, video, audio, to deceive american voters? what are we relying on to advise the public when this inauthentic content appears? director wray, you can start. >> i want to think about what i can say here. certainly ai is something that all of our most significant adversaries are taking a hard look at to enhance their efforts. we have seen ai used in a variety of settings. whether it has been used specifically to target voters, i'm not sure i can say that but

we are actively concerned about that as the latest wrinkle in a long-standing effort to engage in information warfare. >> another example is we have seen evidence that al qaeda in the arabian peninsula has used ai to generate videos aimed at inspiring lone wolf attacks as a result to the gaza conflict as well. >> director haynes? >> another example is russia deploying ai tools in the context of their efforts in ukraine. march 2022, there was a deepfake of the ukrainian president asking ukrainians to lay down their arms and ultimately had to be actually countered by president zelenskyy. >> did we give them the ability to do that quickly? >> the ukrainians? yes, we worked with them on that.

>> general? >> in terms of how we are thinking about ai security, and nsa established a security center to generate and communicate to anyone who is building a model from naia ai perspective what are those threats and what are the security mechanisms to ensure -- to avoid misuse of those models? we are also using the center for how we apply all of the ethical and safety standards of how the department will leverage ai but really the last component would be how do we communicate to those companies the threats they will have of their technology and how will we employ it? >> go ahead. >> you are right to raise this as a threat and i think our view of it is that tools like generative ai will essentially lower the barrier for actors with fewer resources to engage in election interference. >> general? >> i don't think i would add anything to what has been

covered here other than the counterintelligence portion of that that has a touch point across everything. >> somehow participated in the conference and there were 20 tech companies that came together. most of the social media companies on a voluntary basis to indicate both water, watermarking, and willingness to take down ai generated video and voice that were affecting elections but it was voluntary and the proof will be in the pudding. >> no one said they had a plan. advise the american people. >> this committee will be having hearings on this subject very shortly and the senator will be on and have a greater part. senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to all of you for your service and to your teams as

well. director, with regard to the p.r.c. and some recent public reports of significant land purchases, if these land purchases are accurate, they may very well pose a threat to not only some military installations but certainly involved in food production that takes away from our ability to produce for our own country as well. just curious about whether or not you are aware or can confirm land purchases by chinese nationalists within the united states and are you following them at this time? >> so this is an issue we are focused on a lot lately. i think what i would say is we are investigating a number of his essays proactively where we are seeing neither commercial, real estate, or land being purchased by those with ties to

the p.r.c. near critical infrastructure and i want to be clear. foreign purchases of land including chinese purchases of land is not itself inherently illegal but the problem is the risk and as it has been discussed much here already in a different context, the hold that the chinese government and the ccp have over its businesses in particular so we are particularly concerned about situations where a purchase of land near a military -- military installation or critical infrastructure could be leveraged to enable anything from espionage, data collection, or worse. >> do you know if the tools we have in place today are strong enough or capable of stopping these purchases from moving forward? >> well, i mean certainly, a lot of types of transactions go through a process but i am not clear on whether or not that

fully extends to all the land purchase situations that we are concerned about. we are working with -- through the process when that applies and working with the usda to work towards mandatory reporting regime that might apply so i think there is room for plugging gaps that may exist. >> thank you. i would like to also ask with regard to ai in particular, bottom line is it is not going away. it is something that we are going to have to deal with right now. it appears as though we leave the world in regard to ai capabilities. most certainly, our adversaries recognize that and they will do whatever they can as a shortcut to our capabilities. air, land, space, and cyberspace. with regard to the advances with ai right now, i'm concerned as much about china and russia and

their capability to use ai to develop weapons systems that we have never really thought about as being in the forefront of a major and direct threat to the united states and going to talk about biologics. we know that china and russia have significant capabilities with regard to ai and using ai, you can make rapid advances, as you noted. on 30 through 33 in your report i'm concerned about the fact that it may be used as a weapon system. i'm not sure who to direct this to but i will start with director ray and if you would like to pass this on, that's fine. it seems that this is an area that we are not ahead in time to be able to identify and stop them, this is probably as much as a threat to the united states as any other element we have

today. quex i will start with another and others may want to chime in from a military perspective. from an fbi perspective, one of our priorities is protecting american ai innovation from theft, especially from the chinese. america leads the world in ai innovation and ai is often -- to senator gillibrand question about detecting deepfakes in one of the best weapons against ai is better ai. we need to protect that innovation and we are concerned the chinese would -- as i've testified repeatedly -- a bigger hacking program than any other nation combined. if they steal our ai to power it, it makes words like force multiplier an understatement. >> on page 32 of your report you made sure that russia, china, iran and north korea produced

pathogens and toxins in china and russia have proven adept at manipulating information space to reduce trust and confidence in countermeasures and u.s. biotechnology in research. cloaks to share my view that unlawful entry through the southern border shares a serious threat to the u.s. national border? >> i've testified repeatedly that we are concerned about the terrorism implications from potential targeting of vulnerabilities at the border. >> how would you assess the present level of threat and risk of a terrorist attack in the united states compared to past times during your tenure? >> even before october 7, i

would've told this committee that we were at a heightened threat level from a terrorism perspective, in the sense that it's the first time that i've seen, in a long, long time, threats from homegrown violence extremist, jihadist violent extremists, foreign terrorist organizations and state-sponsored terrorist organizations been elevated at one time. since october 7, the threat has gone to another level. this is a time for much greater vigilance then has maybe been called upon of us before october 7. >> is the fbi posture to understand the threat associated with the southern border? we have been briefed on specific threats, do you feel you know enough to assure us the fbi's as well across it as you can be or do you need more resources or feel you are flying blind and not able to define the scope of the threat? >> we are working hard with our

partners but there is no question we need more resources to combat the threat. i will give an example. through working with dhs, they collect dna samples. we provide kits to dhs to collect samples. people come across the border that get sent to the fbi lab. that's part of why we ask for a significant enhancement because of the sheer increase in people coming across means a sheer increase in samples that need to be collected. that's what helps us identify people emitting crime in the united states, or, as has happened too often, they go back across the border and try to re-illegally again. need to process those samples quickly if there's a backlog. we asked for enhancement. not only will we knock it enhancement, there was a 10% cut to the screening center. whatever happened in 24, but i would urge you look at fiscal year 2025 if we are serious

about protecting the border. >> i think it's worth noting that a serious, tough, bipartisan security measure was put forward in the congress. in fact, co-authored by conservative republican member of this committee, which would have searched enforcement resources to the border, which would provided substantial resources to fight cartels and cut down on fentanyl trafficking, it would've tightened asylum standards and expedited adjudication, therefore, movable timelines for those trying to enter the country without a valid reason to. the former president put out the word that he wanted the. for political reasons and the bill was stopped. not only was the bill stopped, it was denied a debate on the senate floor. this speaks to the corrosive impact of extreme partisanship and polarization on our national security. i would like to ask you, how do

our adversaries view the impact of political extremism and polarization in partisanship on american strength and stability. we are talking about world wide threats and it can exploit our own frailties here at home. >> the best way to answer that question is to point to the fact that we have seen both russia and china have taken the opportunity to highlight where there is political dysfunction or other issues that they see in the context of our governance and use it as part of their information operation globally. both to highlight, for example, to their own populations, democracy is quite challenging, and would you really want this at home, kind of thing. also, to demonstrate to our allies and partners that we can be relied on as effectively. >> thank you all for your

testimony. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you, everyone, for being here today. i had been sitting here since 2:30. there is may be an advantage for going last in one of these hearings. i was going to say it was the elephant in the room until my colleague from georgia brought it up. but, as i've sat here, i've heard most members of this committee asked something about the southern border. not everybody, but, the majority. i spent a lot of time on the border, perhaps more time then maybe anybody on this committee, maybe with the exception of senator cornyn. who i've traveled to the border with. and i strongly agree with what most of my democrat and republican colleagues have said about the problems and the challenges. fentanyl coming north, precursors often from china,

heading south. violent extremist organizations, chinese migrants who might be maned selling rather strong marijuana. isis iran proxies, problems at mexico. over and over they pointed out all these problems. i've worked on this issue providing more pay for border control, closing gaps in border wall along the southern border, where they make sense. they certainly do in a lot of places. more money for ngos to help border patrol. director wray pointed out talking about how we need more resources to combat the threat. and it helps when dhs gets oser resources. we have the opportunity to do something about it. more money for technology, including fentanyl detection. more border patrol agents, more asylum officers. more authorities to rapidly expel individuals. a change in the credible

standard. more money for detention facilities. more visas to reunite families, and all this legislation was endorsed by the border patrol union and it had strong bipartisan support. until it didn't. my colleague from georgia points out why it didn't. director ray, is it your -- in your assessment that more resources and stronger policy that could help your partners, not necessarily the fbi, the dhs, is that your assessment that that would help deal with all these things that were mentioned in this committee hearing today? dir. wray: i will leave it to other to speak to policies, but in terms of resources, not just for dhs, before the fbi, we need more resources to deal with all the threats that emanate from the border that we are responsible with.

dir. haines: i don't have anything to add to that. dir. burnes: i don't have anything to add. >> i will yield back the remainder of my time because the failure of that legislation, that alone presents a national security threat, in my view. >> let me say for a moment, we have strong views on this committee. one of the things i think we have always taken some pride in is that we can agree, without questioning each other's patriotism's, without questioning each other's motives, and i hope that tenor will be maintained. members feel very strong, i felt very strong on the board -- border. i do hope, particularly as we deal with our intelligent

professionals, the one thing we've tried is this committee, and one thing that i found is that this agreement, in terms of the intelligence committee, should not go in terms of at home. i don't think i heard that, i heard huge policy differences, we have to have those, but the one thing i hope and pray that you maintain this notion because intelligence professionals never get the recognition they need, look to this committee to be, i hope, an island of sanity in an otherwise challenging political environment. it doesn't take away anybody's views or anybody's right to have those views, but i have the most respect for every member of this committee, regardless of which i'll of the -- they sit on. we owe our intelligence professionals that kind of notions that just because we are

on different political sides that neither political party has a monopoly on truth or patriotism. we have differences in opinions without questioning each other's patriotism. >> reclaiming my time, please. >> mr. chairman, i cannot let the last two speakers go on the democratic side without responding. >> i have been on this committee for 15 years and we do a good job until politics creep in. that is what has happened. these are the facts. the last president of the united states closed the border. he close the border down to almost zero crossings by the time he left office he didn't even know he was sued over and over again by people from the other sides of the aisle. he shut it down and he shut it down under the law that's in effect today. congress has done its job. he has a law saying you cannot enter the united states without

authorization. when the current president came in, we all know he took the policies and the former president tore them up, rescinded them and now we have what we have. as part of the bill that's concerned, everybody is talking about the former president making phone calls. he never called me. i will not look for anything that allows any illegals to cross into this country and everybody knows that bill would've allowed 5000 a day come into this country. that's not for me and i don't care if the president calls me or doesn't call me, my redline is not one. we need to enforce the lies -- enforce the laws we have. the backdoor is going to get close. thank you. >> can i add that the former president in a number of my colleagues repeatedly said to make the kind of changes you need permanently on the border you need legislation.

and that is an ongoing debate we will have here and elsewhere. and what we need in the most important last, i will make, because we will be breaking and going into closed senate, we need in intelligence community that's going to never be afraid to tell truth to power. truth to power sometimes means telling us on both sides of the aisle what we don't necessarily want to hear. i think the witnesses, frankly, the men and women whom we represent, do that on a regular basis. and at the end of the day, while we may haggle over some of these policies, the most important thing you have to do is keep speaking that truth to power. we are adjourned until we move into the classified setting.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

defense. please